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ABSTRACT 
 
The purpose of this paper is to describe how judges engage in constitutional design, irrespective 
of legal tradition. I examine in great detail the role of the judge: as a conflict solver, as a member 
of an institution, as part of the political system and as a human being, for those are factors that 
intervene in the activities he makes. I later analyze the dynamics that a Constitution can have: the 
change in their structure conceptualized as interpretation, mutation and resistance and their 
relation. Interpretation is the determination of the scope of a norm, mutation is the change of 
meaning without amendment and resistance is a concept that bridges the first two, which is the 
capacity of the constitutional rule to adapt to the political game and to assume mutations.  
Finally, these concepts are intertwined in order to show how judges by means of their function, 
(re)design the Constitution by means of adjudication and policymaking (rule issuance by the 
stating of precedent). 
 
1 Introduction 
The purpose of this paper is to describe how judges engage in constitutional design, irrespective 
of legal tradition; to accomplish this, I make use of legal doctrine of both the United States and 
of Latin America and Europe, for they grasp different aspects of constitutional review and 
judicial policymaking.  
I start with the idea that judges have a political role and can use their function to change the 
Constitution they interpret to fill its gaps or to serve other purposes; that is, judges do not merely 
apply the Constitution to a concrete case by means of a deductive or inductive process, they also 
engage in constitution making.  
To understand the nuances of this idea, I examine in great detail the role of the judge: as a 
conflict solver, as a member of an institution, as part of the political system and as a human 
being, for those are factors that intervene in the activities he makes. This is what constitutes the 
core of the first segment of this article. The second part of this study pertains the way in which 
Constitutions change in their structure, which are conceptualized as interpretation, mutation and 
resistance and their relation. Interpretation is the determination of the scope of a norm, mutation 
is the change of meaning without amendment and resistance is a concept that bridges the first 
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two, which is the capacity of the constitutional rule to adapt to the political game and to assume 
mutations. 
Finally, these concepts are intertwined in order to show how judges by means of their function, 
(re)design the Constitution by means of adjudication and policymaking (rule issuance by the 
stating of precedent). 
2 The reality of adjudication 
2.1 The judge and his role 
Through history, judges have acted as problem solvers in societies, helping them maintain 
cohesion by the performance of this role. The concept underlying this endeavor is that of the 
triad, which is defined by Shapiro as a situation that arises whenever conflict exists in a dyad, 
that is, a relationship between two persons, and the intervention of a third to resolve it. This is a 
very universal social pattern that has emerged in almost every place and age.1 
Alec Stone Sweet advances a theory on how they create governance and adapt it to changes in 
society; it has three core elements: the dyad, the triad and the normative structure. He describes 
the dyad as any ““pattern of [direct] exchange” between two individuals or groups”,2 defining a 
wide range of human behavior, being the foundation of Society. This relationship has as a 
normative basis the principle of reciprocity, which links the parties to a “common fate”. 3  
 
 
Figure 1. 
Because the dyad is an unstable structure and when there is conflict it transforms into a triad 
incurring into what is called Triadic Dispute Resolution, which is also a primary form of social 
organization that acts as a guarantor of reciprocity and thus perpetuates the dyad, it is an agent of 
social change. This can be visualized in the classical triangle posited once by Carnelutti: 
 
International Journal of Political Theory                                                                   Emertec R&D 
| Vol. 2, No. 1, 2017 | ISSN: 2371-3321                                                                 www.emertec.ca 
	 3	
Figure 2. 
The main problem of the triad is that when the dispute resolutor gives a holding to the parties, 
those affected by the decision might perceive it as unjust. Shapiro addresses this issue: “At the 
moment the two disputants find their third, the social logic of the court device is preeminent… 
when the third decides in favor of one of the two disputants, a shift occurs from the triad to a 
structure that is perceived by the loser as two against one. To the loser there … only the brute 
fact of being outnumbered…”.45 This is visualized as follows: 
 
Figure 3. 
To combat the perception of unfairness, Carter and Burke say, judges need to justify their 
approach in their decision, for this might stem from the notion that there is no “right answer”, so 
legal reasoning is a justificatory endeavor.6 
Now, to perceive judges solely as conflict solvers is to incur in a misunderstanding of their 
function. It is true, that judges take part on “triadic dispute solving” when they act as a third 
party to solve a conflict, but when their holdings become prescriptions for solving future 
conflicts, the nature of their activities changes. The judges as agents of social order are also law 
makers, and through this function, they create policy. And because they do so, they cannot be 
isolated from politics and ideology.  
2.2 Judges as policymakers 
Judges act as agents of the State when there is conflict, and by creating rules on how to solve 
future conflicts, they act as policy makers. But, the fact that they do so means that they are not as 
constrained as it may be thought, that is, that they do not always “find” what the law says, but 
instead, they make it. Shapiro states that whenever the decisions of a judicial system have 
precedential weight judges policymaking functions, therefore a tension exists between it and the 
rule of law, that is, the notion that they apply pre-existing law (which has been proven false). So 
judges deny their policymaking role, and thus, they lie.7  
Rubin and Feeley, citing Dworkin describe policymaking as “the process by which officials 
exercise power on the basis of their judgment that their actions will produce socially desirable 
results”.8 These authors also seek to stress a difference between policymaking and interpretation, 
stating that for policymaking, the legal text is a source of jurisdiction, whereas for the latter it 
serves as the justification of a decision.9 That is, for policymaking, the legal text is the floor, 
while for interpretation is the ceiling. 
International Journal of Political Theory                                                                   Emertec R&D 
| Vol. 2, No. 1, 2017 | ISSN: 2371-3321                                                                 www.emertec.ca 
	 4	
The third element in Stone Sweet’s theory of governance is the normative structure, which he 
describes as “…the system of rules—or socially constituted constraints on behavior—in place in 
any community…What I call normative structure is equivalent to what North (1990) calls 
“institutions,” variously: “the rules of the game,” “customs and traditions,” “conventions, codes 
of conduct, norms of behavior, statute law, common law, and contracts”…”.10 
The dyad functions in base of a coordination of the self-interest of the parties by means of 
reciprocity and a shared view of the future, it is further cohesioned by the normative structure 
that can help prevent disputes, help the dyad solve them using reciprocity or by helping to 
constitute the triad. When this is the case, as it was mentioned before, has to face the perception 
of unfairness of the affected party by the justification of the decision made, which is product of 
legal reasoning. In the case of adjudication, the triadic dispute resolution is a rule generating 
activity which is abstract, general, and prospective in nature.11 
Whenever the judge creates rules in an abstract way he makes policy. These rules feedback into 
the existing normative system and in this way, there is an adaptation of the existing body of rules 
to the changes of society. Stone Sweet summaries the interaction of the elements of this theory 
with the following illustration:12 
 
 
Figure 4. 
 
2.3 The policymaking process 
Having clarified that judicial policymaking and doctrine (abstract rulemaking) are synonyms; it 
is useful to see the process that judges go through in making doctrine. The first two steps involve 
the existing legal doctrine and the attitudes of the judge and how they interact. Whenever a 
judge’s attitudes clash directly with legal doctrine, these scenarios can happen:13 
a) The judge ignores his attitudes and acts within his understanding of doctrine. 
b) The judge ignores legal doctrine and sentences with his attitudes in mind.  
c) The judges integrates both his attitudes and existing legal doctrine. 
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The third element in the judicial policymaking process is called integration, in it, the judges will 
not try to assure themselves that they are invoking generalized beliefs, but they will be acting 
more instinctively as part of their ordinary decision-making process. The final step in the judicial 
policymaking process is coordination, which involves the propagation of the idea that comes 
from the integration of attitude and doctrine that takes place in a judge’s mind. This propagation 
can be horizontal or vertical, the first one happens when an idea is communicated among peers, 
and the second when the idea is transmitted from a superior to inferiors within a hierarchical 
structure.14  
These topics will be revisited in later parts of this study, when aspects of constitutional design 
are touched; however, it is important to lay out the role of policymaking of the judges as 
prolegomena to this discussion.  
2.4 Judges as members of an organization 
In this section, it will be studied how judges act in an institutional context, and how their 
behavior is shaped by being part of a larger organization of individuals with a set of goals. North 
defines institutions as “…the rules of the game in a society or, more formally, are the humanly 
devised constrains that shape human interaction”.15 Because they seek to influence human 
behavior, these structures provide incentives of varying nature, institutions also shape societies, 
reduce uncertainty by providing a structure.16  
North defines organizations as a “group of individuals bound by some common purpose to 
achieve objectives…”17, they can be of political, economic and social nature, among others and 
in seeking to accomplish their objectives can trigger institutional change.18 
The Judiciary is both an organization and an institution. It is an institution when one sees the 
constitutive rules of the organization and those norms that regulate its functions and their scope; 
it is an organization when one sees the group of men invested to perform adjudicatory functions 
in the name of the State. The way judges are incorporated into an organization can vary from one 
legal system to the other, and it depends upon factors like legal culture, size of population, 
history, budget, and many others.  
For example, in France there is a historical distrust of judges, for in the times of the monarchy, 
they were instruments of repression and of securement of the privileges of the elite. As a 
consequence, there is no mention of judicial branch but a” judicial authority”19 and there are 
three systems of courts: one that has jurisdiction over private law whose main court is the Court 
of Cassation, one that has jurisdiction over administrative law which is the Council of State and  
the Constitutional Council, which handles exclusively questions of constitutionality. 
In civil law tradition, it is common for the judiciary branch to have a career in which aspirants go 
through a hierarchical process of training that will certify their capability of imparting justice as 
judges or magistrates. 
In the American judiciary, the institutional structure is very different: in many states, judges are 
elected, on the federal level, judges are selected in a political process from a pool of 
professionals that include public servants, litigators and there rarely is an opportunity of 
ascending to a higher post. But even with this loose structure, there is an organizational frame of 
mind within judges, because they carry out the same functions and feel integrated into the same 
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structure, also, due to the publication of opinions and the several opportunities of feedback in 
which they can coordinate their ideas and positions.20 
2.5 Judges as part of the political system 
Once that the role of judges has mostly been defined, it is useful to see how judges carry out their 
function in the midst of the political game, that is, within the constant struggle for the allocation 
of power and the implementation of policy. Karl Loewenstein defines power as the function of 
making and deciding policy, and creates a distinction between those that exercise power (“power 
holders”) and those that are the recipients of such activities (“power adressees”).21  
Because it has been said that the judges is a policymaker, it can be understood that he is a power 
holder, and the dyad over which he presides are the power adressees, and therefore he is a 
participant (be it as an individual power holder, or as member of an organization) in the political 
system. Within the political struggle, it can be understood that law is the product of an 
ideological clash, for the legislative process brings about debate and negotiation regarding the 
content of a norm. Because a law is not self applicable, it has to be interpreted by the organs 
charged with its execution, which are usually the executive and its agencies and the judiciary.  
Kennedy defines ideology as “universalization project of an ideological intelligentsia that sees 
itself as acting “for” a group with interests in conflict with those of other groups…”22 The 
members of the intelligentsia can argue the ideology before legislatures, administrative agencies 
and judges when the ideological issues are legal. 23 
To him, the intelligentsia is formed by the “people who operate the ideology, who develop it, 
apply it, and change it sometimes radically, over time…”,24 because of this mutability ideology 
can be different from the interests that fuel it, but not completely autonomous. Ideology is 
defined by the tensions that exists between those groups that form the intelligentsia, which ends 
up permeating the legal materials. 25 
These concepts reinforce the idea that to determine the content of the rule of law- be it by 
enacting norms or by interpreting them- there is an ideological struggle, that is, different interest 
groups support the projects that “universalize” through their values and principles and materials, 
their interests and their implementation. 
A legal question can be structured in two ways: either it is a deductive or a policy argument. On 
the first case, the meaning of a norm is ascertained by a logical, analytical or semantic process, 
which excludes ideology. On the other hand, policy arguments presupposes that deduction is not 
entirely applicable, that is, policy is applied under the notion that the rule in which it is contained 
is desirable under a set of social or institutional values.26  
Finally, Kennedy states that the basis for policy argument is on a “force field” decision process, 
which has the following components:27 
a) More than one policy is likely to apply to a question of law, and the policies are 
perennially (though not necessarily) in conflict. 
b) Rules (subrules) represent compromises of conflicting policies, “drawing the lines” 
that “gives” more or less to each affected interest, right or principle. 
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c) For any given policy question, there will be an indefinitely large number of possible 
rules, each differing from the others in how much it responds to each policy. 
d) In  selecting among the possible rules that would settle the question of law, the judge 
has to “balance” the conflicting policies. 
In deciding a case, the judge will decide the applicability of these arguments by weighing the 
facts of the case and circumstances that constrain argumentation to of one or the other.  
However, the difference between deduction and policy will not always be clear and the judge can 
be susceptible to their misapplication. 
It is important not to lose from sight the fact that policy aspects in law and its application give 
way to ideology, that is, a judge, in choosing the policy argument to solve the conflict submitted 
to his jurisdiction, will do in a way that is akin to his ideology (whether he is conscious of it or 
not). In the words of the author, policy is a “Trojan horse” for ideology. 
2.6 Judges as human beings 
Having analyzed the role of judges as third party conflict solver, policy maker, member of an 
institution and partaker in the political system, it is necessary to consider in them an aspect that 
seldom is recognized in scholarship. Judges are human beings.  
That is, as every other human being they have been shaped by their circumstances and 
experience and they have a system of values that help them understand the environment in which 
they live. They have a perception of things varies from that of other fellow humans, even when 
they have the same role. 
Judge Posner coincides with these notions when he talks about the role that preconceptions have 
on rational though, for even if they sometimes are inaccurate, they are information and it varies 
from person to person. He explains them thoroughly:28 
…these attributes might converge to form a general cast of mind that would in 
turn generate specific preconceptions that a judge brings to the case. Our 
perceptions are produced by the interactions between sensory impressions-the 
impact of the external world on the organs of sense- and a classificatory apparatus 
in the brain… In other words, people see (literally and figuratively) things 
differently, and the way in which they see things changes in response to changes 
in the environment. That is true of judges. As Cardozo said, “We may try to see 
things as objectively as we please. None the less, we can never see them with any 
eyes except our own.” 
What Posner says holds true: human beings have different perception of things one from the 
other, and so do judges. Also, there are varying degrees in intelligence, skills and many other 
attributes among people; this is also applicable to the judiciary. Not all adjudicators are created 
equal. 
The legal training that is required of judges and the institutional requirements of selection can be 
means to attempt to overcome these differences and offer certain standard of quality to those that 
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seek an adjudicative remedy. Also, the degree of institutionalism assures that there will be some 
consensus among its elements. 
Because human being is relative in its nature, it can be said in agreement with Carter, that there 
is no “right answer” to a difficult legal problem; however, a judge within his capacity can justify 
the path taken in making a decision, and after he has done so, his ideas can be held by others of 
the same hierarchy and by his inferiors and polished beyond the intended scope. That is, there 
can be a consensus. Also, it is important to note that the decisions made by judges will also 
reflect the moral of the time.  
Finally, the risks that the dehumanization that the legal process can lead into are also worth of 
note. Judge Noonan talks of masks as a metaphor of said dehumanization: “By mask I mean a 
legal construct suppressing the humanity of a participant in the process. Mask is the metaphor I 
have chosen for such constructs, because the human face is where emotion and affection are 
visible if not deliberately concealed”.29 
Judges, he acknowledges, in doing their role can be masked for “It may be that the role becomes 
a mask whenever the purpose of serving others is forgotten; the judge who has forgotten the 
purpose of justice is almost surely masked”.30 
The masks that judges employ are a consequence of the wear that the legal process can cause in 
them and the efforts to relieve themselves from it to accomplish their function:31 
The users of any system-scientific, theological, legal-encounter points where their 
premises and their practices are inconsistent. These gaps in the system must be 
bridged or the system changed. To bridge the gaps, those who accept the system 
employ fictions… fictions are a necessity of law…Masks are a variety of fiction. 
At the points of a legal system where it is too much to recognize that a human 
being exists, a mask is employed. The intolerable strain is relieved. It may be 
supposed that as fictions in general are a necessity, so the subspecies of fictions, 
masks, are inevitable. 
All these factors are important to understand the dynamics of both the interpretation of the 
Constitution and the policymaking process that judges can undertake.   
2.7 Judges from outer space: A reprisal. 
For the better development of some of the topics developed in past paragraphs, it is quite useful 
to draw reference from literature, not on grounds of what the great writers have stated about 
judges, but what have they said about human nature. A most illustrative book in this aspect is 
The Little Prince, written by Antoine de Saint Exupery.32 
Though it may seem as a simple children’s book, it is an introductory guide on human behavior 
by means of simple examples (perhaps too simple for the taste of grownups) like the relationship 
between the Little Prince and his rose, or the Little Prince and the fox, which explore love and 
friendship. 
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When the Little Prince ventures out of his planet by taking advantage of a migration of wild 
birds- leaving his two volcanoes and his rose behind- he explores a series of asteroids before 
arriving on Earth: 325, 326, 327, 328, 329, and 330. 
These asteroids were inhabited by a king, a conceited man, an alcoholic (or a tippler in the book), 
a businessman, a lamplighter and a geographer, and by conversating with them, he gains insight 
on the activities and motivations of grown ups.  It would be interesting to imagine if he had 
stumbled with the seldom visited asteroid 331 before arriving to Earth, and that this celestial 
body would be inhabited by a judge:  
The seventh planet was inhabited by a judge, who was clad in a black robe and dusted wig, he 
was seating behind a desk which was at the same time both simple and imposing.  
"Please approach, so that I may hear your cause" said the judge as he saw the little prince. 
“Who are you?” asked the little prince. 
“I am a judge” said the judge with an air of authority “now, what business brings you 
before this court?” 
“Business?” inquired the little prince. 
“Yes” said the judge somewhat impatiently “do you have a conflict for me to solve?” 
Unbeknownst to the little prince, was the fact that to judges, all men argue a cause before 
them. 
“Well” said the little prince humbly, “I left my rose at my planet and I miss her”. 
“Internal conflict is outside my jurisdiction. Do you have an external conflict? That is, 
one between you and somebody else” said the judge in a terminant tone. 
“No, why should I?” answered the little prince puzzled by the question. 
“Sometimes, men have conflicts with one another. I solve them as an impartial third 
party” informed the judge. 
 “What is “impartial”?” asked the little prince. 
“Treating all rivals or disputants equally; fair and just” responded the judge, browsing a 
thick book as a sign of impatience to the questions of the little prince. 
“How can you do that?” asked the little prince. 
-“I look at the applicable law and adapted to the facts presented before me to issue my 
sentence.” Said the judge as technical as ever. 
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“But if you rule one disputant over the other, don’t they feel that you are against them?” 
asked the little prince. 
- “As I said, retorted the judge angrily, I am impartial, I just find what the law says on 
particular issues.” 
“And how do your sentences solve the problems?” inquired the little prince. 
“These holdings help to avoid social conflict as they set a path for similar future 
controversies to be decided in the same manner by my fellows at the bar ”, said the judge in a 
very formal and scholarly tone. 
-“But then you are making laws”, said the little prince. 
-“I do not legislate, said the judge offended by the words of the little prince, I just solve 
conflicts.” 
- “But sir, said the little prince tactfully to appease the judge, if you say one thing, but do 
another differently, aren’t you lying?33 
The judge threw a plaque from his desk to the little prince, which missed narrowly, and then 
turned his seat 180 degrees. The little prince looked at the former projectile; it read “Hon. 
Hercule Main”.34 
"The grown-ups are very strange," the little prince said to himself, as he continued on his 
journey.  
Indeed young sir, they are. 
3 Constitutional dynamics 
3.1 Constitutional interpretation 
Brest defines constitutional interpretation in the following manner: ““Constitutional 
interpretation” comprehends the methods or strategies available to people attempting to resolve 
disputes about the meaning or application of the Constitution.”35 Who can interpret the 
Constitution? Walter Murphy responds by saying: ““Just about everybody” is a roughly accurate 
response to the question who interprets. Judges are highly visible interpreters; but every public 
official sometimes, explicitly or implicitly, interprets the constitution”.36 
If it can be interpreted by anyone, then whose interpretation is definitive? An almost mechanical 
answer would be that the judges by virtue of judicial review can interpret the Constitution due to 
the fact that they have taken an oath to uphold the Constitution, 37   however, this affirmation, 
included in Article VI of the Constitution38 is general. If the judiciary, according Marbury v 
Madison39 can declare laws unconstitutional because it has sworn to uphold the Constitution, 
what happens to the other branches of the government? They also have a duty to uphold the 
Constitution, and they must do so, within the scope of their own nature. 
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When they do, it can be said that they are applying the Constitution and because no law can be 
applied by itself, then they are making a valid interpretation of the Constitution. Regarding the 
private citizen, whenever they are contesting the constitutionality of a law or act of government 
because they consider it in violation to their rights, the interpretation they submit to the judges is 
one that will carry force if it’s taken into consideration. This structure of joint interpretation 
converges in what Louis Fisher calls the doctrine of “coordinate construction”. He says:40 
Under the doctrine of “coordinate construction,” the President and members of 
Congress have both the authority and the competence to engage in constitutional 
interpretation, not only before the courts decide but afterwards as well. All three 
branches perform a valuable, broad, and ongoing function in helping shape the 
meaning of the Constitution.  
Allan Brewer Carias defines the principle of constitutional supremacy as a manifestation of the 
popular will, and manifests itself as a constitutional right to have to said supremacy;41 the 
preamble of the US Constitution gives continuation to the idea.42 Interpreted harmoniously with 
the Constitutional preamble, the idea of constitutional supremacy advanced by Brewer gives 
people the right of applying the Constitution, that is, to see that it is upheld, and with it the 
possibility of interpreting the Constitution, for no law is self-enforcing. With this said, it can be 
concluded that whoever seeks to apply the Constitution has a valid constitutional interpretation. 
There is no infallible way for understanding and interpreting the Constitution, no right answer. 
Whoever seeks to apply the Constitution may have a valid interpretation of it; however, judges, 
by their exercise of judicial review, are interpreters of the Supreme Norm and can employ any 
method of ascertaining the meaning of the Constitution to justify their reasoning in the 
performance of their functions.  
Judges have a system of values (that include morals) and experiences that allows them to 
understand and interact with their environment, they also have a level of training and 
institutional thought that assures certain frame of mind and a standard of legal knowledge. 
Product of their legal training is the knowledge of a specific language, which according to 
Bourdieu, “combines elements taken directly from the common language and elements foreign to 
its system. But it bears all the marks of rhetoric of impersonality and neutrality”.43 The use of 
this language in the Constitution allows it to incorporate many conflicting elements of social life, 
product of ideological clashes; into a language that a judge can use in interpretation to give them 
some amount of coherence.  
Carter and Burke describe the elements of judicial reasoning, that is, those things that the judge 
must harmonize in order to convince of the quality of his reasoning:44 
• The case facts established in the trial and preserved in the record of the evidence 
produced at the trial. 
• The facts, events and other conditions that we observe in the world, quite apart from the 
case at hand, which we call social background facts. 
• What the rules of law, that is, the official legal texts created by the state, say about cases 
like this 
• Widely shared moral values and principles. 
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When submitted with a conflict that requires the interpretation of the Constitution, because the 
case facts and the facts are directed towards this situation, a judge will choose among the legal 
materials that he has available, that is, the rules of law that includes the Supreme Norm itself, 
and the interpretation that the parties and the several amici curiae provide and using as a base the 
different values (moral, ideological and others), experiences, legal knowledge, he will use 
interpretative methods to justify the conclusions he reaches in his proposed solution to the legal 
problem submitted to his jurisdiction. The use of these methods will vary according to a complex 
series of factors, among which we can find the case facts, the formation of the judge, the facts, 
legal culture, and popular perception. 
The purpose of constitutional interpretation is to fill a deficiency in the law by means of 
extending the signification of the legal text. When a gap in the law is to be filled, but there is not 
a norm to interpret, then the activity to be made is that of gap-filling, known to civil law 
scholarship as “integration”. This limitation is best expressed by Sagues45: “The integration of 
the constitutional norm is a legal creative process, destined to cover the “gaps” in the 
Constitution. It is a mechanism distinct from that of interpretation, because here, there is no norm 
to interpret” (author’s translation).  
3.2 Constitutional gap-filling 
Sagues, in his study of judicial constitutional interpretation approaches constitutional gap-filling 
and gives a concept on what is a constitutional gap: “…they are only those normative gaps the 
import “institutional failures, lack of fundamental institutions that impede the functioning of the 
constitutional order”. Constitutional gap is one that puts the legal-political order of the State “in 
great commotion””.46 
This author divides constitutional gap in two types: historical gaps, 47 which are those in which 
the Supreme Norm does not regulate matters regarding the structure and operation of the State 
due to circumstances not envisioned by the Framers, and the axiological gaps48 are those in 
which there is an existing constitutional norm, but this goes against legal and political values. 
In the same fashion as in constitutional interpretation, it is necessary to ask: Who can integrate 
the Constitution? Is it only a task befitting the amendment procedure?  Sagues gives a pragmatic 
answer: “It is not sensitively possible that the judge stops sentencing or the executive to 
administrate in the presence of a constitutional gap… it would mean the paralysis of public 
services or the administration of justice when not the legislative process, until the constituent 
power is summoned and he decides what were necessary”.49     
To complement this answer is necessary to remember the constitutional oath contained in Article 
VI of the Constitution, if it bestows upon all of the organs of government the duty to uphold the 
Constitution and there is a gap that impedes them to act within the scope of their faculties, then 
they are capable of filling the gap presented in the Constitution.  
Professor Sagues also makes a classification of the sources of constitutional gapfilling and 
divides them in two: Self-integration,50 which consists of filling the gap by means of analogy 
with the Constitution and its principles, and heterointegration, which is the use of “legal 
principles, starting with those of constitutional law51 that are above the Constitution, as well as 
natural law and exemplary foreign law”.52 
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3.3 Constitutional mutation 
Constitutional mutation has been a recurrent topic of study in European constitutional theory 
since the end 19th century. Jellinek defines constitutional mutation as: “that modification of the 
Constitution that leaves its text unchanged, without formal amendment that is produced by facts 
that do not have to be followed by the intention or conscience of such mutation” (author’s 
translation). 53  While Dau-Lin as “the incongruence that exists between constitutional norms on 
one hand and the constitutional reality on the other” (author’s translation).54 
 
Early positivists like Laband and Jellinek defined the mutation of the Constitution as a problem 
that arose in the political practice of the Constitution of 1871. In his view, Dau-Lin also 
perceived it as a problem, but he also helped to define its nature.55 To me, mutation is a feature 
of rigidness in constitutions, but it is not necessarily a problem. Only when the mutation is in 
contradiction of the Constitution, it can be considered as pathology or a problematic. 
When trying to explain the endurance of Constitutions, Elkins, Ginsburg and Melton develop a 
theory of constitutional bargain and renegotiation. They have three facts that help a constitution 
endure the enforcing and renegotiation processes: inclusion, specificity and flexibility.56 Their 
idea of flexibility is similar to mutation, but they are not the same, for the former not only 
comprises the idea of mutation, but also of resistance, which will be explored later.  
When there is a tension between the Supreme Norm and the reality, the mutation arises as a form 
of liberating such pressures, changing the sense of the Constitution, but rendering it still 
applicable, otherwise there would be a rupture in the constitutional order and the Supreme Law 
would not endure, for the continuous unresolved stress would result in a breakdown of its 
established order. 
 Mutation must be understood then as a coping mechanism for Constitutions so they can endure 
stress brought by time, internal and external changes and interactions between the subjects of the 
Constitution. And so Elkins et al understand it, when they justify the need for flexibility: “Given 
the existence of exogenous shocks that change the costs and benefits to the parties to a 
constitutional bargain, constitutions require mechanisms for adjustment over time”.57 
Regarding the limits of mutation, Da Silva says that the conflict between reality and norm can be 
resolved: “a) by constitutional amendment, b) by the prevalence of the norm over the fact by a 
firm judicial decision”.58 Pedro de Vega takes these notions further: 
… Meanwhile the always latent tension between the fact and the norm, it is not 
presented in terms of a conflict and manifest incompatibility, the constitutional 
mutations can coexist with the principle of constitutional supremacy, without the 
latter suffering a significant determent. The problem of the limits of mutation 
starts when the tension between the facts and the normativity turns socially, 
politically and legally into a conflict that endangers the notion of supremacy 
itself. It is then when it appears ad the only possible alternative to, either convert 
the constitutional practice (mutation) in a norm through amendment, or deny the 
legal value of the mutation, in the name of existing legality...59  
International Journal of Political Theory                                                                   Emertec R&D 
| Vol. 2, No. 1, 2017 | ISSN: 2371-3321                                                                 www.emertec.ca 
	 14	
3.4 Constitutional gapfilling as mutation 
Mutation does not consist of ascertaining the meaning of a Constitution; ideally, it looks to 
change it to relieve the pressure of an exogenous stress, although there are mutations that can 
cancel the content of the Supreme Law. Gap-filling implies change in the sense of the 
Constitution without amending the text, but this does not mean that it is synonym with mutation. 
The latter is every change (beneficial or detrimental) to the Constitution without amendment, 
gapfilling looks to adapt the Constitution to external stimuli, so it can be said that mutation is the 
genre and gap-filling the species. 
Gap-filling comes from a stress caused by exogenous conditions, which include the passage of 
time. This pressure impedes the correct function of the Constitution, and to prevent the collapse 
of the constitutional order, its meaning its changed (although not its text) to allow it to overcome 
the obstacle referred before. Both mutation and gap-filling can be done by any organ of 
government (no matter which branch it belongs to) through norms (statutes or regulations), 
custom, political convention and constitutional precedent. Gap-filling as a sector of 
constitutional mutation can be made by using the Constitution or by using external sources to fill 
the gap, but always done under the frames of legal reasoning. 
An equivalent in American constitutional doctrine to constitutional gap-filling as mutation is 
constitutional construction,60 already analyzed in the study of the limits of constitutional 
interpretation. Regarding the need for constitutional construction, Balkin states the following:61 
We need construction in two situations. The first is when the terms of the 
Constitution are vague or silent on a question and to apply them we must develop 
doctrines or pass laws to make its words concrete or fill in gaps. The second is 
when we need to create laws or build institutions to fulfill constitutional purposes. 
Both of these practices are the work of living constitutionalism. 
It then becomes clear that constitutional construction comprises the concept of gapfilling by 
means of judicial and legislative action, as shown in the constitutional mutation typology. 
3.5 Constitutional resistance 
The notion of constitutional resistance can be extracted from the teachings of Spanish professor 
Francisco Tomas y Valiente: a) The resistance of the Constitution can be understood as the 
adaptability to the political dynamic; b) it is also its capacity of being interpreted in a flexible 
manner and to change in function of new problems and sensibilities; c) it is also a resistance to 
amendment, making it unnecessary; d) constitutional resistance must be elastic, it consists of 
assimilating, without leaving out, the different political expectatives not opposed frontally to its 
text; e) a Constitution has resistance if its capable of coupling the norms with the political reality, 
that is, its capacity to assume mutations.62  
Resistance, like mutation, is a feature of rigid constitutions and is the capacity a Constitution 
possesses to adapt to change. It finds itself working as a bridge between constitutional 
interpretation and mutation, for it can be conceived as an interpretation that expands its content, 
or the assimilation of gap-filling that changes its meaning altogether. In short, like mutation, 
resistance is part of a Constitution’s capacity to respond to external pressures. 
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3.6 Relationship between constitutional interpretation, resistance and mutation. 
Constitutional interpretation and resistance are similar in substance, because they are forms of a 
Constitution for coping with the different circumstances that influence in its duration, however 
they differ in the fact that interpretation can expand the meaning of the Constitution as long as 
the norm permits it, but the nature of resistance is adaptability to change and though it overlaps 
in some terrains with interpretation, it can prescind of it and border with gap-filling.  
As was said before, resistance is a feature of the rigidity of a Constitution, but interpretation is 
not, for a flexible Constitution, as any law, can be interpreted. 
Regarding the interception of interpretation and resistance, it is worthy to mention a 
constitutional interpretation Sagues calls mutative interpretation, which is an interpretative 
process that admits the existence of a mutation.63 He divides this interpretation in two types:  
interpretation  promotive of the mutation64 which is one that gives origin to the mutation and 
interpretation recognizant of the mutation,65 which consists of the verification and reception of a 
mutation made in custom and admits it as a turn from the text of the Constitution. 
These concepts are not as much as the realm of interpretation, as they are not looking to 
determine the meaning of the Constitution, but to give way to gap-filling, however, they are not 
constitutional mutations, but these acts are within the scope of constitutional resistance. , which 
is an intermediate concept, that fills the gap between interpretation and integration (mutation).  
In U.S. case law, an example of mutative interpretation can be found in Cooper v. Aaron, written 
in 1958 by Chief Justice Black on the eve of Brown v Board of Education. In explaining the 
reach of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court makes an 
interpretation of the Supremacy Clause, and of Marbury v Madison:66 
Article VI of the Constitution makes the Constitution the ‘supreme Law of the 
Land.’ In 1803, Chief Justice Marshall, speaking for a unanimous Court, referring 
to the Constitution as ‘the fundamental and paramount law of the nation,’ 
declared in the notable case of Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177, 2 L.Ed. 
60, that ‘It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say 
what the law is.’ This decision declared the basic principle that the federal 
judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution, and that 
principle has ever since been Se9c174c29c1b1 respected by this Court and the 
Country as a permanent and indispensable feature of our constitutional system. It 
follows that the interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment enunciated by this 
Court in the Brown case is the supreme law of the land, and Art. VI of the 
Constitution makes it of binding effect on the States ‘any Thing in the 
Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding. (emphasis 
added) 
By stating that the constitutional interpretations carried out by them are part of the supreme law 
of the land, the Supreme Court justifies their potential for mutating the Constitution. This case 
fits perfectly into the idea of mutative interpretation carried out by Sagues, for this interpretation 
gives support to the interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment made in Brown, but recognizes 
the idea of extending the scope of the Constitution even beyond its original meaning. 
International Journal of Political Theory                                                                   Emertec R&D 
| Vol. 2, No. 1, 2017 | ISSN: 2371-3321                                                                 www.emertec.ca 
	 16	
Mutation (gap-filling) and resistance both originate from a rigid Constitution, that is, one that 
makes difficult the amendment process or impedes it.  They both react before the problem of a 
gap that endangers the Constitutional order, however, resistance is also akin to interpretation and 
the ascertaining and expansion of a Constitution’s meaning without presenting a complete 
change in it. If it weren’t like this, resistance would not be distinguishable from mutation, as is 
the case with constitutional gap-filling.  
The concepts of interpretation, resistance and mutation (constitutional gap-filling) are related 
with the capacity of a Constitution to endure and be applied, although they differ regarding the 
method they use to do so, for an interpretation expands a meaning, mutation changes it and 
resistance dwells within both having a nature of its own. 
The idea of the flexibility of a Constitution advanced by Elkins, Ginsburg and Melton comprises 
the concepts of interpretation, resistance and mutation. Flexibility is the capacity of the text of a 
Constitution to adapt and incorporate external stimuli into its structure, this ranges from 
expanding its meaning or changing it altogether. Interpretation, resistance and mutation are 
variations of a Constitution’s meaning when responding to external stimulus, be it political, 
economic, legal, the passage of time, among others imaginable. That is, they are degrees of 
constitutional flexibility. 
4 Judicial constitutional design 
4.1 Relationship between adjudication and constitutional dynamics 
Having stated the different sides of the judicial function and how the Constitution transforms its 
contents according to the circumstances and the passage of time, it is now necessary to relate 
them both, as a prelude of the topics of the unwritten constitution and judicial policymaking as 
constitutional mutation. 
When a judge, acting as a Triadic Dispute Resolutor, applies the Constitution (normative 
structure) by means of his function he is either interpreting or mutating it (rulemaking), and he 
does it with all the factors of judicial behavior intervening in this process, as it was shown with 
the depiction of the interpretative process carried out by the adjudicator.  
This means that he possesses a set of values defined by his interaction with society, experiences, 
training and institutional thought, which will be used to justify the determination of the content 
of the interpretation of the Constitution or the changes that will be made as mutation by means of 
judicial policymaking, when the judge integrates his attitudes with legal doctrine. 
A prime example of interpretation can be found in Gibbons v Ogden, in which Marshall C.J. 
interpreted the scope of the word commerce in the U.S. Constitution. 67A curious mutation can be 
seen in the “separate but equal” doctrine stated in Plessey v Ferguson68- later overturned by 
Brown v Board of Education among other precedents-, in which the Equal Protection Clause was 
applied by the Supreme Court to uphold a Louisiana segregation law that mandated separate 
railroad cars for blacks and whites, stating that equal protection is circumscribed in civil rights, 
but not social conventions. 
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This changed the meaning of this clause for the time it was effective. The policymaking process 
carried out by this decision was consequence of the conflict of the judge’s attitudes and the law, 
in which the ensuing integration resulted in the idea that separation could foster equality. 
Finally, an instance of interpretative mutation can be found in the prison reform cases that took 
place between 1965 and 1986, in which many state prison systems-starting with Arkansas- were 
declared unconstitutional on grounds of the Eight Amendment.69  
This interpretation served as a grant of jurisdiction to courts that allow them to create and 
implement policy, through the attitudes-doctrine-integration-coordination process stated in 
previous paragraphs. By providing a justification for policymaking and mutation, this 
interpretation can be considered mutative. 
4.2 Judicial policymaking and judicial doctrine 
A small reprisal of judicial policymaking is useful for the development of this topic: 70 
Policymaking – says Howard E. Dean-is deciding what is to be done by choosing 
among possible actions, methods or principles for determining and guiding 
present and future actions or decisions. Courts, especially high appellate courts 
such as the Supreme Court often make such choices, establishing new rules and 
principles, and thus are properly called policymakers. 
Judicial doctrine can be defined as:71 “bodies of rules or principles either authoritatively declared 
or systematically advocated”. Another definition is provided by McNollgast: “We interpret 
doctrine as being the set of rules and methods to be used to decide a particular class of cases”.72 
The scope of doctrine is also defined:73 
…The Court has the discretion to make the range of variability in acceptable 
outcomes narrow or broad. At one extreme, it can tolerate chaos by refusing to 
hear all appeals on a given issue, thereby implicitly establishing a “doctrine” that 
any feasible outcome is acceptable. At the other extreme, the Court can specify 
completely the outcome that ought to emanate from a given category of cases, and 
tolerate no deviation. 
 
If one makes a contrast between judicial doctrine and policymaking, it is easy to realize that they 
are synonyms: both involve decision making of present and future cases through methods, 
principles or general rules. 
Another concept of importance is that of stare decisis, which is the “principle that precedents are 
to be followed in the adjudication of cases”.74 This principle helps to determine the range of 
judicial policymaking, for lower courts are bound to follow the principles set by the Court in its 
case law. However, the Supreme Court is not bound to its own precedent, and can act upon its 
policy preferences. Shapiro has a useful view of stare decisis, which is described by Kritzer:75 
Incrementalism, Shapiro observes, is “a method of decision-making that proceeds 
by a series of incremental judgements as opposed to a single judgement made on 
the basis of rational manipulation of all the ideally relevant 
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considerations”…Shapiro argues that incrementalism is a much better description 
of the process of judicial policy-making that is stare decisis, in no small part 
because of the fundamental flaws of the classical view of stare decisis… The core 
of Shapiro’s analysis is that precedent is best conceived not as an immutable line 
of binding principles but as reflecting a particular style of incrementalism… 
Shapiro’s concern here is not so much with who wins and who loses in specific 
cases but rather with the evolution of legal doctrine that guides the actions of 
potential future litigants… 
 This means that policymaking is a dynamic and evolving process, for new circumstances 
not contemplated by the initial rule or principle can emerge as additions or exceptions to it, or the 
Supreme Court can elaborate a principle that is fine-tuned by the appellate courts as future cases 
get to be decided. 
4.3 Judicial policymaking as constitutional mutation 
Courts are policymakers: They engage in such activity by means of declaration of rules, 
principles or methods in the cases that they get to decide, they get to direct the outcome of future 
cases- by means of integration of attitudes and legal doctrine- ever changing and evolving when 
circumstances comprised by future cases make it necessary.  
Judicial policymaking was distinguished from interpretation by Rubin and Feeley by saying that 
for the former the text is a source jurisdiction, while for the latter it is a justification of a 
decision. In constitutional matters, policymaking comprises the areas of constitutional mutation 
and resistance, that is, policymaking can be made either by a constitutional interpretation that 
supports it or fosters it (mutative interpretation) or by a change in the constitutional text without 
amendment (constitutional gapfilling as a type of mutation). Policymaking can ensue by means 
of an omission, that is, when a norm is effectively not applied, as is the case of the XIII 
Amendment, which states:76 
Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime 
whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United 
States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction. (emphasis added). 
In this case, the text of the Constitution abolishes slavery in general, except for the case of 
imprisonment; however, this part of the Constitution has seldom- if ever- been applied. In this 
case, policy was made by mutating the Constitution through omission in its use. Stressing on 
this, Grey commented that the nature of the role of the Court as constitutional mutator is not 
entirely jurisdictional; therefore it is outside the realm of the justification of a sentence 
(constitutional interpretation):77  
Second, one can ask the jurisprudential question whether as a general matter the 
defining and enforcing of basic rights without external textual guidance is 
essentially a judicial task... A rigorously positivist jurisprudence would hold that 
judicial decision not directed by the articulate command of a determinate external 
sovereign is not truly adjudication. Rather it is a species of legislation. But this 
sort  of positivist also views the entirely traditional judicial task of common law 
development through case-by-case decision as a form of legislation. If common 
International Journal of Political Theory                                                                   Emertec R&D 
| Vol. 2, No. 1, 2017 | ISSN: 2371-3321                                                                 www.emertec.ca 
	 19	
law development is an appropriate judicial function, falling within the 
traditionally accepted judicial role, is not the functionally similar case-by-case 
development of constitutional norms appropriate as well? Granted that the 
supremacy of constitutional law over legislation, when contrasted with the 
formally inferior status of common law, makes a great difference. But the 
difference is in the hierarchical status of the judicial decision--which turns on a 
question of authority--and not in the intrinsic nature of the task. 
 
The constitutional mutation is brought upon general by means of principles that are 
systematically declared in a series of cases, that is, one precedent can establish a rule, which is 
defined in subsequent cases as the passage of time, the political dynamics and other factors put 
stress upon the constitutional order. 
In these cases, when the stress is unavoidable and the interpretation of the Constitution 
impossible, the Supreme Court, as guardian of the constitutional order, must change it to prevent 
its systematical failure and keep it functioning. That is, the Court is used as an escape valve of 
the pressure that accumulates upon the Higher Norm. 
Finally, the role of the Supreme Court in determining the constitutional content by means of 
policymaking can be summarized by Dean:78 
Clearly the Supreme Court is more than just a legal body: the Justices are also 
“rulers” sharing in the quintessentially political function of authoritatively 
allocating values for the American polity. Representing a coordinate branch of the 
national government, they address their mandates variously to lawyers, litigants, 
federal and state legislative, executive and judicial officials, and to broader 
concerned “publics.” … They do not expound a prolix or rigid legal code, but 
rather a living Constitution “intended to be adapted to the various crises of human 
affairs,” as Chief Justice Marshall said in the McCulloch case. And the Justices 
employ essentially common law judicial techniques: they are inheritors indeed, 
but developers too- “weavers of the fabric of constitutional law”- as Chief Justice 
Hughes observed. The nature of the judicial process and the growth of the law are 
intertwined... 
5 Conclusion 
1. Judges not only interpret the law, but they create it through doctrine and by doing so, they 
make policy choices, they decide between competing ideologies contained in legal 
materials and are participants of the political system by being power holders within the 
scope of their assigned competence.   
2. However, judges are also human beings, and can succumb to the pressures of the 
endeavor they are to carry out by creating masks, that is, legal constructs by which they 
hide their humanity whenever making a decision.  
3. A Constitution, like any law, is subject of application and as such it has flexibility, that is 
the capacity to adapt to the everchanging circumstances of human social interaction. This 
capacity is comprised in the following factors: interpretation, mutation and resistance.  
4. When the subject matter is the Constitution, the judges- as the other members of the 
branches can- interpret and mutate it within the scope of their activities, which means that 
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they are constitutional (re)designers. Their interaction helps build the constitutional order 
of the polity. 
5. It was shown that precedents can have varying nature regarding their relation with the 
Constitution, and that policy implementation through doctrine established in a series of 
precedents can imply a change in the meaning of the Constitution without an amendment 
process.  
6. The judges design Constitution using their moral values, legal training and policy 
preferences as a starting point, and then they conciliate these positions with the legal 
materials available, which can be divergent or convergent with their ideologies and 
preferences. 
7. Whenever the Supreme Norm is interpreted (be it a simple or a mutative one) or mutated, 
this expansion is incorporated and ends up creating a system, which is the constitutional 
order. This is consequence of the nature of the Constitution, which must adapt to a series 
of varying circumstances, this means constant interpretation and when there is a strong 
stress on this system a mutation ensues. 
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